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Abstract: Classical logic is typically concerned with abstract analysis. The problem for a synthetic
logic is to transcend and unify available data to reconstruct the object as a totality. Three rules are
proposed to pass from classic logic to synthetic logic. We present the category logic of qualitative
opposition using examples from various sciences. This logic has been defined to include the neuter
as part of qualitative opposition. The application of these rules to qualitative opposition, and, in
particular, its neuter, demonstrated that a synthetic logic allows the truth of some contradictions. This
synthetic logic is dialectical with a multi-valued logic, which gives every proposition a truth value
in the interval [0,1] that is the square of the modulus of a complex number. In this dialectical logic,
contradictions of the neuter of an opposition may be true.
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1. Aristotelian or Analytical Logic vs. Dialectic or Synthetic Logic
From the cognitive flow where consciousness grasps neither itself nor the outside world, in which
needs, attitudes, trends, movements, and internal and external perceptions form an undifferentiated,
unreflective dynamic, rational thinking emerges with analyses based on the perception of identities
and differences fixed and structured by language. The results of the analyses are abstract concepts
whose content is identical to a set of different objects. Abstract concepts are arranged hierarchically,
general and particular, but their main characteristic is to be general, we might “especially” wish to ask
them to be “less general”. At this early (required) stage of scientific thinking, reasoning conforms to
an analytical logic whose prototype is Aristotelian logic. The basic principles of Aristotelian classic
(analytical) logic include the following:
(1) Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC): It is impossible that something is true (P) and false (¬P) at
the same time, though both can be false ¬(P ∧ ¬P).
(2) Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM): Either a proposition is true or its negation is true: alternatively
put, P ∨ ¬P. It is also called tertium non datur, meaning that the third possibility is not given.
(3) Principle of Exclusive Disjunction for Contradictories (PEDC): exactly one is true; exactly one is false.
Let P be a proposition and ¬P its negation. From Morgan’s Theorem, PNC can be transformed
into PEM and vice versa, but this only demonstrates that Morgan’s Theorem estimates PEDC. Logics
that deny PEM must deny some forms of Morgan’s Theorem. PNC and PEM do not need to be
equivalent in n-valued logics when n > 2, although the principles must be reformulated for these logics
and could seem very different. Even in two-valued logics, these three formulas are different as soon as
we replace P and ¬P with P and Q. The relationships that they affirm are only equivalent in a special
case: when the relations of contradiction are affirmed. If we used a two-value logical standard, the
three principles do not appear in the form of axioms. The three principles can be demonstrated to be
logical, but any such proof would be viciously circular.
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The PNC is a fundamental principle of classical or analytical logic. In this logic, any contradiction
should be rejected as false, which is expressed by the expression: ∀P, v(P ∧ ¬P) = 0. The algebraic
reduction for this expression is: p(1− p) = 0, an equation which admits as solutions p = 0; p = 1, i.e.,
a single solution that retains Aristotelian logic.
Many classical logic principles (PNC, PEM, PEDC, etc.) are invalidated in modern logics.
For example, PEM is invalidated in neutrosophic logic (neutrosophy is a generalization of dialectics,
i.e., while in dialectics, there is a dynamic of opposites, in neutrosophy, there is a dynamic of opposites
and the neutral between them because that what is happening in our real world. For example, if two
countries, A and B, go to war against each other—thus A and B are the opposites—then some neutral
countries interfere in the war, helping one side or another. Hence, neutrosophy is better applied to our
world than dialectics [1], not only by the Principle of the Included Middle, but also by the Principle of
Multiple-Included Middle [2].
The synthesis comes after the analysis: the thought that wants to materialize already has all the
analytical data, and it does not pretend to ignore nor reject the truths of abstract logic, but persists,
however, to assume them. Returning to both the object itself and analytical truths, however, thought
brings together and unifies the operations of abstraction that have elaborated these truths, at the
cost of countless rejections of peculiarities, so that it will also bring together and unify the thinking
that will illuminate its object as a whole organized totality. The totality constructed in thought is, in
general, not static but a dynamic becoming, an emergence of knowledge. The principle of totality is the
fundamental principle of dialectical logic, and we use synthetic logic and dialectic logic interchangeably
here, ignoring their differences.
We enumerate three elementary rules of this kind of logic:
(1) Keep analytic truths.
(2) Rule of unity or aggregation: with synthesis setting itself the task to recreate the unity of the
object, it will return to the totality of the attributes that the analysis contained and dispersed in
parts; all that is predictable as parts of the object will become predicable to a whole. Therefore,
in synthetic logic, being is the only predicate.
(3) Rule of the resulting quality or the totality.
Following Priest [3–7], we will say that a logical system is paraconsistent, if and only if its relation
of logical consequence is not “explosive”, i.e., iff it is not the case that for every formula, P and Q, P and
not-P entails Q; and we will say a system is dialectical iff it is paraconsistent and yields (or "endorses")
true contradictions, called “dialetheias”. A paraconsistent system enables one to model theories, which,
in spite of being (classically) inconsistent, are not trivial, while a dialectical system goes further, since
it permits dialetheias, namely contradictions as true propositions. Still following Priest, the semantics
of dialectical systems provides truth-value gluts (its worlds or set-ups are overdetermined); however,
truth-value gaps (opened by worlds or set-ups which are underdetermined) are considered by Priest to
be irrelevant or even improper for dialectical systems. Besides this, sometimes the distinction is drawn
between weak and strong paraconsistency, the latter considered as equivalent with dialectics. A reader
of recent literature in this field may have an impression that dialectics as strong paraconsistency is
more a question of ontology than of logic itself, namely that it allows for the existence of “inconsistent
facts” (in our actual world), which should verify dialetheias. One more introductory remark has to be
made here: in recent literature on paraconsistent logic, there is some disagreement about the generally
accepted distinction between paraconsistent and dialectical logical systems. However, it remains an
open question whether semantic paradoxes express any “inconsistent facts”.
A synthetic logic founded on rules 1, 2 and 3 must admit the truth of certain contradictions. If it is
called dialectical, a logic that accepts that there are contradictions that may be true, then, in such a
synthetic logic, there is a logical dialectic and meaning. The principle of totality, even at an elementary
level, as here presented, necessarily leads to the principle of contradiction PNC.
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2. The Opposition
Some oppositions are indivisible data to thought, and their poles cannot be known in isolation
but only with each other and in contrast, one to the other. These oppositions we will call logical dipoles.
Thus, if we put a line and the displacement of a point along the line, the two possible directions of
movement are identified immediately. Most logical categories are dipoles. Thus, it is impossible to
define identity and difference separately, each being determined only by the negation of the other; true
and false, necessary and contingent, etc. The logical importance of dipoles is that they limit analytical
thinking, and its ability to divide and define in isolation. The same categories of logic are unnoticed
in analytical logic, which applies them without being able to understand them because they are not
analyzed. The dipole emerges in a synthetic logic or a dialectical logic.
Quality and quantity, logical categories, constitute a dipole. Quantitative differences are within
a qualitative identity. Thus, the physical quantities (mass, temperature, electric charge, etc.) are
qualities–quantities, that is, quantized qualities. Conversely, qualities are attributes that can present
quantitative differences (bigger, smaller, equal), each being identical while having these differences.
Positive, negative, rational and irrational are qualities of real numbers, for each of these attributes is
indifferent to the magnitude of the number and encompass all quantitative comparisons between the
numbers. Similarly, a function f in y = f (x) is the quality, and the difference between two functions f
and g is qualitative because the function is identical to itself, though quantitative differences in the x
and y variables show the differences.
Let Q be a general quality.
Definition 1. When a general quality Q subdivided is by means of elementary analysis into two particular
subqualities Q1, Q2, these two subqualities are called opposite qualities, or poles of a qualitative opposition.
The identity or coincidence of the opposites Q1, Q2 is the general quality Q that is common.
Definition 2. This general quality Q will be called the unity of the opposition.
The idea of a coincidence of opposites is merely the expression of the neo-Platonic principle of
the identity of the multiple. The Neoplatonists systems strove to show how from the most absolute
unity, the One, the multiplicity of reality unfolds through a sliding scale. Each of the moments or
steps of this scale represents a moment of greater dispersion relative to the upper rung, but it also
implies a platform, where the realities of the bottom rung are unified and not yet dispersed. Looking
at the scale from above, from the maximum unity of reality, each rung of the ladder successively shows
a greater dispersion of the real; looking at the scale from below, from the maximum dispersion of
sensible reality, each step up shows a greater degree of unity and concentration (coincidence) of reality.
The maximum degree of unity corresponds to the first principle, the One. The coincidence of opposites
signifies an understanding beyond the capacity of human reason. In response to this, Nicholas of Cusa
distinguished two levels in knowledge or power, Reason and Understanding. Reason is governed
by the principle of noncontradiction, which renders it incapable of understanding the coincidence
of opposites: the PNC requires that something cannot be and not be at the same time, e.g., a line
cannot be both curved and not curved, and, therefore, it is impossible to match the intended meeting
of opposites. However, the supreme power does not depend on reason but on Understanding, and
Understanding can gather the contraries or opposites that Reason declares incompatible (note that in
general the opposites are not symmetrical).
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Example 1. Let 1 be the truth value indicating truth.
(1) The object is the set of microphysical corpuscles: as there are positive, negative, and positive and
negative at the same time, and not electrified corpuscles, if one notes the proposition P1 “C is the
electrified positive corpuscle” and the proposition P2 “C is the electrified negative corpuscle”, P1 and P2
are not logically coordinated.
(2) The object is the set of electrified corpuscles. Then, the true disjunction is v(P1 ∨ P2) = 1.
Opposites are disjunctive or sub-opposites.
(3) The object is the set of elementary microphysical corpuscles, i.e., none are positive or negative,
that is, they are not electrified. Then, we will have true incompatibility v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = 1.
Opposites are incompatible or contrary.
(4) The object is the set of microphysical electrified elementary corpuscles. Then, we will have true
mutual exclusion v(P1 m P2) = 1 . Opposites are exclusive or contradictory.
This example teaches us that as abstract analysis progresses, the opposite qualities,
without logical coordination, are: sub-opposite (disjunctive), after opposite (incompatible) and
ultimately contradictory.
Consider a whole with two opposite qualities Q1 and Q2 that are quantitatively uneven. The
quantitative comparison is obviously founded on a common quality Q. Rule 3 concerning the resulting
quality consists in attributing another quality to the whole, and by contributing the resulting quality, it
is this quality which quantitatively dominates the other.
Definition 3. The whole is equipped with two opposing and quantitatively similar qualities. This equality
defines the neuter of qualitative opposition.
Example 2. Suppose an elastic material link connecting two points M and N. This link includes both an
attraction and repulsion. When the distance |MN| is greater than a certain value r0, attraction dominates
repulsion and the link is called attractive. It is called repulsive when |MN| < r0 because then the repulsion
is dominant. Therefore, in each case, the link does not stop being both attractive and repulsive, but rather has
assigned to it the dominant quality.
The neuter is the case where |MN| = r0, attraction and repulsion is then compensated exactly,
and the link strength is zero. Under Rule 3, there is no attraction or repulsion, whereas under rule 2,
attraction and repulsion continue working.
We see here that qualitative opposition, enriched by the neuter, leads to synthetic thought
(dialectical), although here in this example, it is reduced to elementary forms.
3. The True Contradictions
We will present several cases of application of these rules to qualitative opposition.
3.1. Application of Rules 1 and 2
Take, for example, the Möbius surface. The analysis decomposes a strip into infinitesimal elements.
All elements of non-zero curvature have a concave face and a convex face. Let P01 and P02 be the
following propositions: P01 = “the face F of the element E is concave”, and P02 = “the face F of the element E
is convex”. Considering the elements of zero curvature (neither concave nor convex) of Möbius strips,
the incompatibility of P01 and P02 is true:
v(¬P01 ∨ ¬P02) = 1
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According to Rule 1, we keep this analytic truth, but Rule 2 forces us to replace P01 and P02 “E
element” by “Möbius surface”. P01 and P02, thus modified, are annotated P1 and P2, and we obtain,
therefore, a first dialectical logic equation:
v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = 1 (1)
Consider globally a Möbius surface that has only one face: F is the only face that is both concave
and convex again, and here we always refer to rule 2. We will have then:
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1 (2)
It is this unique face, along a certain line of zero curvature, that is neither convex nor
concave where
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1 (3)
Finally, we get the system of logical equations:
v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1
(4)
and this system of equations is insoluble in classical logic as 4-1 and 4-2 are in themselves a
contradiction, where the equivalence: ¬P1 ∨ ¬P2 ⇔ ¬(P1 ∧ P2) .
3.2. Application of Rules 1, 2 and 3 to the Neuter of a Qualitative Opposition
See Example 2: the analytical equation is v(P01=P02) = 1 and not v(¬P01 ∨¬P02) = 1, = being the
complementarity between two propositions because there is a partial interaction of M with N that will
be neither attractive nor repulsive. Rule 1, corrected by Rule 2, results in the formula v(P1 m P2) = 1 .
Rule 2 always gives v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1. Rule 3 will be formulated as v(P1) = 1 if the quality is dominant and
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1 if it is a neutralized opposition. In the latter case, it is a system of logical equations
such as: 
v(P1=P) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1
(5)
4. The Degree of Truth
Let p1 and p2 be the truth values of P1 and P2, respectively. Consider system of Equations (5).
It becomes the following system of algebraic equations [8]
p1 + p2 = 1
p1 p2 = 1
(1− p1)(1− p2) = 1
⇒

p1 + p2 = 1
p1 p2 = 1
p1 + p2 − p1 p2 = 0
(6)
This equation does not support any real solutions because p1 and p2 are roots of the equation
x2 − x + 1 = 0. The truth values in a multivalued logic are real numbers belonging to the interval
[0,1] [9]. However, this multi-valued logic does not resolve the problem because it is essentially
analytical. The equation p2 − p + 1 = 0 is the characteristic equation of the true contradiction in a
multi-valued logic. Indeed, if P signifies any proposition whose truth value is P, its contradiction ¬P
has the truth-value 1 − p. The true contradiction is reflected in the logical equation v(P ∧ ¬P) = 1
whose algebraic equation of truth values is p(1− p) = 1⇒ p2 − p + 1 = 0 . System of Equations (5)
expresses a contradiction in a dialectical logic based on the rules 1, 2 and 3 and has to be true.
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The equation p2 − p + 1 = 0 has complex roots [8]:{
p1 = 12 + i
√
3
2 = e
i pi3
p2 = 12 − i
√
3
2 = e
−i pi3
(7)
This allows us to express the truth values using complex numbers.
Suppose the case where the quality contained in P1 is dominant:
v(P1=P2) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
v(P1) = 1
(8)
It is possible to solve system of equations (8) taking truth values as modules of complex numbers
(or the squares of these modules, in which nothing changes because it has truth values 0 and
1). Algebraically: 
|p1 + p2| = 1
|p1 p2| = 1
|p1| = 1
(9)
This system allows for the solution {
p1 = ei
pi
3
p2 = e−i
pi
3
(10)
Consider now the case where the analytical coordination of opposites is the disjunction. According
to the rule that says when the analysis becomes increasingly less strict, and correspondingly the
synthesis progresses, this coordination then passes from v(P1 m P2) = 1 to v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = 1 and then
v(P1 ∨ P2) = 1. It leads us to study the next case. This will result in the neuter of the opposition in the
following system: 
v(P1 ∨ P2) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1
(11)
Both in multivalued logic and classical logic, incompatibility can be written as v(¬(P1 ∧ P2)) = 1
or v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = 1, these two compound propositions being equivalent. Therefore, Equation (4) can
be written as: 
v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = 1
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
(12)
The qualitative opposition and its neuter lead, in definition, to two basic types of systems of logic
equations: systems of Equations (5) and (12); system of Equations (5) contains one contradiction and
system of Equations (12) contains two.
However, in seeking solutions for this method, we reject multivalued logic because p1 and p2 are
not the truth values of the propositions, but are complex numbers, determining by their modules these
truth values. Therefore, we are entering a new logic.
5. Dialectical Logic with Two Disjunctive Values and Complex Truth Values
The logic presented here is multivalued: every proposition is equipped with a truth value in the
interval [0,1] [9]. However, every truth value here is determined by a complex number that is the truth
value of the proposition.
Mathematics 2016, 4, 69 7 of 11
5.1. Truth Values
To every proposition P is assigned a truth value p = |p|eiα, with the condition |p| ∈ [0, 1]. In the
complex plane, there is a one-to-one correspondence between a proposition P and a point P of affix α
located inside or over a circumference of the trigonometric circle. There is the same correspondence
between a proposition P and a free vector
→
p of the plane, equipollent to
→
OP, O being the center of
the circle.
5.2. Negation
The truth value ¬p of the negation ¬P of the proposition P is defined by the relationship
|p + ¬p| = 1
Figure 1 shows that there is a set of negations {¬P} of the same proposition P, a set that has the
power of the continuum.
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The truth table for negation is shown in Table 1:
Table 1. Truth table for negation.
P T TF
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Consider, for example, the proposition P = “it rains in the province of Alicante”. If it is true, its
negation ¬P = “it does not rain in the province of Alicante” may be false if it has rained on the entire
territory of the province, or be true if it has not rained in more than one part. The negation just defined
makes sense in synthetic logic (Rules 1 and 2).
5.3. Contradictory or Strong Negation
The contradictory or strong negation of a proposition P, denoted ¬P, will for truth value,
by definition, be ¬p = (1− |p|)eiα; in Figure 1, it can be seen that ¬P ∈ {¬P}.
e e t i ti is t e c tra ictory of a r sition an its e ation is lrea y f lt i
i t c te t of the proposition belongs to a particular science but when it
belongs to the same logic. Thus, P1 ⇔ P2 is the n gation f equivalenc betw en P1 and P2, which can
be either because there is no logical coordination or because they are linked by a coordination that is
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different from equivalence. Conversely, the contradiction of equivalence ¬(P1 ⇔ P2) is in Aristotelian
logic a precise coordination: mutual exclusion P1 m P2 .
The truth table for contradiction is shown in Table 2:
Table 2. Truth table for contradiction.
P 1 0 < |p|2 < 1 0
¬P 0 (1− |p|)2 1
Returning to the previous example P = “it rains in the province of Alicante”, if this proposition is
true, its contradiction can be spoken as “it does not rain in the province of Alicante” may not be false,
since it can rain throughout the territory of the province or in a part only.
Coordination P⇔ ¬P is possible and occurs when |p| = 12 .
5.4. Equivalence
By definition, the equivalence of two propositions P1 and P2 is: p2 = |p2|eiβ and it is true when
|p1| = |p2|.
5.5. Complementarity
By definition, the compound proposition P1=P2 is called the complementarity of two propositions.
P1 and P2 has the truth value v(P1=P2) = |p1 + p2|2 on the condition |p1 + p2| ≤ 1.
Complementarity is commutative. It may be false without either P1 or P2 being false. For this,
it is necessary and sufficient for |α− β| = pi. P1 and P2 being true, it is true if |α− β| = 2pi3 .
The complementarity of n propositions, with commutative and associative properties, has the
truth value: v(P1=P2= . . .=Pn) = |p1 + p2 + . . . + pn|2 on the condition |p1 + p2 + . . . + pn| ≤ 1.
From the definition of complementarity, it follows that ∀P, v(P=¬P) = 1.
5.6. Conjunction
By definition, the conjunction P1 ∧ P2 has the truth value: v(P1 ∧ P2) = |p1 p2|2. It has the
commutative property. The combination of n propositions has the truth value: v(P1 ∧ P2 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn) =
|p1 p2 . . . pn|2. It is commutative and associative.
5.7. Weak Contradictions
We will call weak contradictions the compound propositions P ∧ ¬P with truth values
p∗ = |p||¬p|ei(α+α′). Weak contradictions can be true. This rule is of great importance for synthetic
or dialectic logic: v(P ∧ ¬P) = 1⇒ |p| = |¬p| = 1 . Figure 2 shows that the true contradiction
has solutions:
p = eiα
¬p = pei(α+ 2pi3 )
p + ¬p = eiα( 12±i
√
3
2 )
We find the complex roots of −1.
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Figure 2.
∣∣P ′1∣∣ = ∣∣P ′2∣∣ = 1; p + ¬p = OM′1; P ∧ ¬P = 1.
For exa ple, the eak contradiction “it rains on the province of licante and it does not rain on the
province of licante” is true if and only if it does not rain on ore than a part of the province.
5.8. Strong or Strict Contradiction
We define as strong or strict contradiction the compound proposition P ∧ ¬P with truth value
p∗ = |p|(1− |p|). As in Aristotelian logic, |p| = 0 is false and |p| = 1 is true. However, |p| will never
be true, and its maximum truth value is reached when |p| = 12 , that is, 0.0625, i.e., is very weak.
Putting
v(P ∧ ¬P) = 0 (13)
different truth values of 0 and 1 are excluded. Equation (13) is the equation of reduction of dialectical
logic to Aristotelian logic, which is disjunctive, so T and F values become exclusive.
The strong contradiction “it rains on the province of Alicante and it does not rain all over the province of
Alicante” is false in all cases.
5.9. Incompatibility
It is defined as a negation of the conjunction. If µ denotes a unitary complex number µ = eiω,ω
havi g a v lue such that ¬P1 ∨ ¬P2 belongs to the set of negations of P1 ∧ P2. Then,
v(¬P1 ∨ ¬P2) = |µ− p1 p2|2 (14)
6. Resolution of Contradictions
Let the system of Equations (5) be the system

v(P1=P) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1
. Only simple negations
generate true contradictions, and we must eliminate the formulation of the system of Equations (5)
strong negations. The algebraic version of the system of Equations (5) is then
p1 + p2 = µ1
p1 p2 = µ2
(u1 − p1)(u2 − p2) = µ3
(15)
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where µ1, µ2 and µ3 are the unit complex numbers of suitable arguments. p1 p2 = µ2 requires
|p1| = |p2| − 1 as true for P1 and P2. For the same reason, (u1 − p1)(u2 − p2) = µ3 requires that ¬P1 is
a true denial of P1, and ¬P2 is a true denial of P2. p1 + p2 = µ1 requires, as a consequence of p1 p2 = µ2,
that |α− β| = 2pi3 . Graphically (see Figure 3):
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Figure 3. Resolution of contradictions.
Considering the system of Equations (11):
v(P1 ∨ ) = 1
v(P1 ∧ P2) = 1
v(¬P1 ∧ ¬P2) = 1
Its formulation in dialectical logic will be
µ0 − p1 p2 = µ1
p1 p2 = µ2
(u1 − p1)(u2 − p2) = µ3
(16)
p1 p2 = µ2 requires that P1 and P2 are true and (u1 − p1)(u2 − p2) = µ3 requires that ¬P1 be a true
negation of P1 and that ¬P2 be a true negation of P2. µ0 − p1 p2 = µ1 requires, as a consequence of
p1 p2 = µ2, that arguments of p1p2 have a difference equal to ± 2pi3 . the system of Equations (11) is
solved easily like the system of Equations (5).
7. Conclusions
Admitting the truth of a contradiction is extremely difficult for most of those who practice these
parcels of knowledge that are called scientific. In spite of their understandable reluctance, we claim that
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classical logic never managed to oust contradiction from rational thought. Did not the Eleatics discover
the famous antinomies that Aristotelian logic had failed to solve? Kant noted other contradictions
hidden in the Newtonian concepts of space and time. In addition, modern mathematics, the theory
of sets in particular, faces up to these contradictions, a problem which is catching the attention of
logicians. While analytical logic has allowed and allows the development of particular scientific
theories, its axioms insist that there be no contradiction. For this reason, it has been unable to resolve
the logical and general problem of contradiction because, at some point in abstract analysis, analytical
logic always gets caught in the antinomy trap.
The present authors are aware that the work is incomplete and plan to investigate further
interesting perspectives. For example, opposition can be extended to opposition with neutrality.
The degree of truth can be extended. The degree of falsehood may be studied as in intuitionistic
fuzzy logic along with the degree of indeterminacy (or neutrality, i.e., neither true nor false) as in
neutrosophic logic. Likewise, paradoxes such as the liar or Achilles and the tortoise may have different
explanations using this logic. All of this can be developed in future work.
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